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Abstract—The critical path in schedule analysis defines the series 
of tasks that have no schedule slack leading to the delivery of a 
system. The critical path for NASA science missions, which 
typically runs through a spacecraft subsystem or a scientific 
instrument, is dynamic and changes over the development lifetime 
of a project. Often the critical path at the start of preliminary 
design will be through a specific spacecraft subsystem while the 
final, delivered critical path item is often a scientific instrument 
that is delivered late. The research for this paper looks at the 
postulated critical path at different milestones, and the actual 
critical path item at final delivery, for a variety of NASA science 
missions to understand what elements are impacting the delivery 
schedule the most. Recommendations are made based on these 
quantitative results relative to what elements should potentially be 
considered more often in early development schedules to more 
robustly plan for development issues.   
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 1. INTRODUCTION 
The critical path of a project is defined in the NASA Systems 
Engineering Handbook [1] as “the sequence of dependent 
tasks that determines the longest duration of time needed to 
complete the project.” Assessing the critical path of a NASA 
science mission requires a keen understanding of the 
development challenges that are inherent in meeting mission 
requirements. These challenges arise from many sources 
including technology development required for the mission, 
the development and/or manufacturing of spacecraft and/or 
instrument hardware, or the integration of the spacecraft 
and/or instrument(s) and/or activities required to integrate 
and test the complete satellite. Identifying the critical path is 
based on recognizing these potential challenges as well as the 
previous experiences of the project team and their biases.   
The critical path of the project is dynamic, changing as the 
project evolves. As the NASA Systems Engineering 
Handbook [1] states, “As the project progresses, the critical 
path will change as the critical tasks are completed or as other 
tasks are delayed.” The determination of what element should 
be on the critical path during the mission is often subjective, 
since it is a forward forecasting schedule, and requires the full 
insight and recognition of the project team. For example, if a 
spacecraft subsystem is on the current critical path, but an 
instrument is 3 days off the critical path and has just suffered 
a setback, the instrument lead may not immediately volunteer 
that their instrument should be placed on the critical path. The 
instrument lead may have mitigation strategies to investigate, 
and may want to wait to see if the spacecraft or other elements 
could suffer delays that would keep their instrument off the 
critical path. This is often referred to in the space industry as 
“space chicken” where some element leads that are close to, 
but not on, the critical path may not disclose how close they 
are to the critical path while assuming that some other 
element will experience a delay. The term “space chicken” is 
derived from the term “playing chicken” which is defined [2] 
as “to engage in a test of courage in which, typically, two 
vehicles are driven directly toward one another in order to see 
which driver will swerve away first.”   
For NASA science mission developments, the selection of 
the critical path is typically a choice between the spacecraft 
bus, and its subsystems, and the scientific instrument(s). As 
the Aerospace industry has developed over time, spacecraft 
busses have become more common to be more of a 
commodity item with “standardized” busses. NASA science 
instruments, however, which constantly push the state of the 
art to achieve world-class science, are typically more of a 
development challenge. As noted by the NASA Office of the 
Chief Engineer, instrument development can become the 
primary technological challenge for the success of a mission 
[3]. The difficulty of developing a world-class instrument can 
lead to delays in its delivery to the spacecraft for system 
integration and test (I&T) [4]. These delays can lead to cost 
growth while the spacecraft, mission, and ground system 
team waits for the instrument to be delivered. The subsequent 
“marching army” cost can be significant and is one of the 
primary causes of cost growth for NASA missions [5].   
The difficulty of instrument development versus spacecraft 
development can be seen when investigating resource growth 
for historical NASA missions. A previous study reviewing a 
subset of 20 NASA missions in greater detail demonstrated 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20200001574 2020-03-28T19:16:08+00:00Z
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that resources such as mass and cost grew at a significantly 
greater rate for instruments than spacecraft [6]. Figure 1 
shows the average percentage mass and cost growth of the 
instruments and spacecraft from the start of Phase B for the 
20 missions in the previous study and shows that the growth 
for instruments is essentially twice the growth for spacecraft. 
This incongruity implies that instruments typically are less 
mature or experience more volatility than spacecraft at  
the initiation of a project, as shown by the differences in  
mass growth, and implies that this lack of maturity can lead 
to higher cost growth for the instrument relative to  
the spacecraft. 
 
Figure 1.  Mass and Cost Growth, from Phase B Start,  
of Instrument Payloads vs. Spacecraft [6] 
Instrument immaturity can lead to development issues which 
lead to schedule growth. A previous instrument schedule 
growth study conducted for 86 NASA instruments showed an 
average schedule growth of 10.4 months, or 32.3%, from 
Phase B start to delivery [4]. Figure 2 shows the plot of 
planned versus actual instrument delivery durations which 
indicates that almost all were delivered late. 
 
 
 Figure 2.  Comparison of Average Actual vs. Planned 
Durations of 86 NASA Instrument [4] 
The previous study [4] also looked at what phase the schedule 
growth occurred and identified that, although the growth 
began after the Preliminary Design Review (PDR), the 
majority of schedule growth happened after the Critical 
Design Review (CDR). Figure 3 shows the average growth 
relative to milestones and shows that a growth of 7.5 months, 
or 49.7% over the planned duration, occurred from CDR to 
delivery. 
 
Figure 3.  Comparison of Average Actual vs. Planned 
Instrument Development Phase Durations [4] 
 
The NASA Space Flight Program and Project Management 
Handbook also identifies that the instrument development 
schedule growth is significant stating that “recent analysis of 
instruments developed between August 1990 and November 
2009 shows the average instrument development schedule 
growth was 33 percent or about 10 months” which is 
consistent with analysis presented in this paper and the 
previous studies [7].   
More recent studies have looked at the resource growth for 
80 NASA instruments and 46 NASA spacecraft [8], [9]. The 
studies, which looked at the growth of mass, power, cost, and 
schedule at different milestones, showed that instrument 
growth, in all cases, was significantly higher than spacecraft 
growth. Specifically, the average schedule growth for NASA 
instruments from the start of Phase B was 36%, while the 
average schedule growth for NASA spacecraft was 28% [8], 
[9]. The data from these studies demonstrates that science 
instruments have more difficulties in development than 
NASA spacecraft. 
2. STUDY APPROACH 
To identify the historical critical paths for NASA missions, 
schedule data was collected for 40 different missions at 
different milestones, as shown in Table 1. Schedules for each 
milestone were collected to determine if the instrument or the 
spacecraft were on the critical path. Milestones included the 
start of Phase B, otherwise known as Key Decision Point B 
(KPD-B), PDR, CDR, and at final delivery.   
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Table 1.  List of Missions Included in Study 
Mission Science 
Type 
Launch 
Year 
TRMM Earth Science 1997 
Terra Earth Science 1999 
RHESSI Heliophysics 2002 
ICESat Earth Science 2003 
GALEX Astrophysics 2003 
Spitzer Astrophysics 2003 
SWIFT Astrophysics 2004 
Deep Impact Planetary 2005 
MRO Planetary 2005 
New Horizons Planetary 2006 
CloudSat Earth Science 2006 
STEREO Heliophysics 2006 
THEMIS Heliophysics 2007 
AIM Heliophysics 2007 
Phoenix Planetary 2007 
DAWN Planetary 2007 
Fermi  Astrophysics 2008 
IBEX Heliophysics 2008 
OCO Earth Science 2013 
Kepler Astrophysics 2009 
LRO Planetary 2009 
WISE Astrophysics 2009 
SDO Heliophysics 2010 
Juno Planetary 2011 
NuSTAR Astrophysics 2012 
RBSP Heliophysics 2012 
LDCM Earth Science 2013 
IRIS Heliophysics 2013 
LADEE Planetary 2013 
MAVEN Planetary 2013 
GPM Earth Science 2014 
SMAP Earth Science 2014 
MMS Heliophysics 2015 
OSIRIS-REx Planetary 2016 
CYGNSS Earth Science 2016 
TESS Astrophysics 2018 
InSight Planetary 2018 
Parker Solar Probe Heliophysics 2018 
ICESat-2 Earth Science 2018 
ICON Heliophysics 2019 
The missions include schedule data collected from  
8 Astrophysics, 11 Heliophysics, 10 Earth Science, and  
11 Planetary Science missions as identified in Table 1. The 
data set includes 15 missions managed by the Jet Propulsion 
Laboratory (JPL), 15 by the Goddard Space Flight Center 
(GSFC), and 10 by other organizations. The missions provide 
a robust representation of different NASA mission types, 
organizations, and science objectives. 
For the 40 missions shown in Table 1, the critical path was 
assessed based on the mission’s project schedule at each 
major milestone. The dates were recorded for the spacecraft 
and instrument(s) delivery to system I&T and the critical path 
was assessed. In most cases the critical path was clearly 
defined but, in some cases, typically early in a project’s 
lifecycle, multiple elements may have all been on the critical 
path to be delivered into system I&T at the same time. In 
those cases, it is noted that both the spacecraft and 
instrument(s) are on the critical path. 
3. HISTORICAL CRITICAL PATH RESULTS 
The importance of properly identifying the critical path 
cannot be overstated. If the critical path is improperly 
determined early in the project, then the project can be 
delayed and incur a “marching army” cost awaiting the 
delivery of the critical component on the true critical path. 
This effect is notionally illustrated in Figure 4 where the 
development duration of the instrument was understated such 
that the instrument delivery is delayed resulting in the start of 
the system I&T phase being delayed. In the example, the 
project would incur a marching army cost awaiting the 
instrument delivery.  
Figure 4.  Instrument Delay Effect on Project Schedule 
The impact of marching army cost can be significant.  
A previous study [10] investigated the contribution of 
schedule delay to “marching army” cost and determined that 
“21 of the 28 missions (75%) have estimated cost growth  
due to schedule growth greater than 50% while the average 
contribution of estimated cost growth due to schedule  
growth for the complete mission set was 73%, indicating  
that schedule growth can be a significant contributor to  
cost growth.” 
The results of the analysis from investigating the 40 missions 
listed in Table 1 are shown in Figure 5, which identifies the 
percent of the time at each milestone the spacecraft or the 
instrument was on the critical path. As can be seen for  
KDP-B at PDR and at CDR, the percentage of time the 
spacecraft and instrument are on the critical path is essentially 
equivalent. This implies that the project team considered 
either element to be as likely on the critical path with the 
instrument being identified approximately half the time and 
the spacecraft identified the other half. At delivery, however, 
the percentage of time that the instrument is on the critical 
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path is greater than 3 times more likely than the spacecraft, 
with the instrument being on the critical path 77.5% of the 
time while the spacecraft being on the critical path 22.5% of 
the time.  
 
Figure 5.  Critical Path Summary at Each Milestone 
To dive further into the data, the schedule growth from Phase 
B to delivery for both the instrument and the spacecraft, 
which compares the initial planned delivery duration at the 
start of Phase B to the final actual schedule duration at 
delivery, was calculated for each mission. The average 
schedule growth for the instrument is 33.8% and the 
spacecraft average schedule growth is 25.3%, which is 
consistent with the 38% and 26%, respectively, from 
previous studies [8], [9]. This equates to an average schedule 
delay of the instrument being 14.2 months while the average 
spacecraft delay is 9.5 months, a difference of over 4 more 
months for instruments compared to spacecraft. Due to  
the “space chicken” effect, however, the real difference 
between instrument and spacecraft development duration 
may be greater. 
The difference between different science types was also 
investigated with both Earth Science and Astrophysics 
having the longest average instrument delays at 19.4 and 18.2 
months, respectively. This is intuitive given that Earth 
Science and Astrophysics instruments are typically more 
complex than Planetary and Heliophysics instruments. The 
difference between instrument and spacecraft delays was 
consistent, however, with the range being from 3.5 months 
for Planetary science missions to 6.1 months for Earth 
Science missions. In addition, the spacecraft was on the 
critical path at delivery roughly a similar percentage of the 
time with the low range being Heliophysics at 18.5% and the 
high range being Planetary at 27.3% of the time.   
In addition, the majority of growth in planned versus actual 
instrument delivery duration occurs after CDR. Of the 
average 33.8% growth that occurs from Phase B to 
instrument delivery, two-thirds of that growth occurs after 
CDR. The average planned duration from CDR to instrument 
delivery for the missions studied was 15.9 months whereas 
the actual duration was 24.9 months, an increase of 9 months 
or 56.5% great than planned. These results are consistent with  
 
the values shown in Figure 3 from a previous study, and 
indicate that most of the instrument schedule growth is not 
identified until after CDR. 
4. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The clear indication that over 75% of the time the instrument 
will be on the critical path should solicit recommendations 
that projects set the critical path going through the 
instrument(s) throughout their lifecycle. These 
recommendations come in the following form:   
 
1) Increased awareness of instrument critical path 
tendencies 
2) Increased instrument schedule reserves 
3) Better assessment of instrument schedule duration 
4) Change in acquisition approach 
 
Each of these recommendations are discussed in the 
following sections. 
4.1 Increased Awareness of Instrument Critical Path 
Tendencies 
One of the primary, obvious questions that arise is, how can 
spacecraft be forecasted to be on the critical path at KDP-B, 
PDR, and CDR greater than 25% of the time when more than 
75% of the time, the instrument finished on the critical path? 
Increasing the awareness of instrument schedule growth, 
such as this paper, previous studies, and NASA’s own 
analysis, is important in helping NASA projects to consider 
the instrument as the primary critical path more often. An 
approach that could be considered is to document that the 
instrument should be the primary consideration for the 
critical path when developing an initial schedule. The authors 
reviewed the NASA Systems Engineering Handbook, the 
Expanded Guidance for NASA Systems Engineering Volume 
1, and the NASA Schedule Management Handbook and, 
although all address how to determine the critical path in 
NASA projects, none identified the instrument(s) as the 
primary critical path hardware item to be considered [1],  
[11]–[12]. A simple section emphasizing the instrument early 
on the critical path and including historical data, similar to 
references [4], [7]–[8], and the results of this paper, could 
potentially influence project managers (PM) to consider the 
instrument as the critical development item. 
 
The authors also postulate that there is an unintentional bias 
against putting the instrument initially on the critical path due 
to the majority of PMs who come from a spacecraft system 
engineering or spacecraft-subsystem background such that 
their main development concern is the spacecraft. A quick 
look at the background of the PMs for the last 10 missions 
included in the analysis identify that 7 of the PMs have 
primarily a spacecraft development background. The 
background of the PMs could bias the early critical path 
selection from a spacecraft perspective as opposed to looking 
more closely at the instrument.   
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In addition, merge bias may be a consideration for the 
spacecraft. Merge bias is defined as the impact of having two 
or more parallel paths of activities, each with its own 
variability or uncertainty, merging into one milestone or other 
activity [13]. The sheer number of components for a 
spacecraft may lead to a bias toward placing the spacecraft 
on the critical path given that there are more spacecraft 
schedule tasks specified early in a project’s life than 
instrument tasks as the project schedule is initiated. It is 
suggested that the project planning and control process would 
benefit from additional insight into merge bias and perhaps 
be aware of the number of tasks associated with the 
spacecraft and instruments at a project’s initiation to ensure 
limited bias. 
4.2 Increased Instrument Schedule Reserves 
Previous studies have identified that industry standard 
schedule reserve guidelines are focused more at the system 
level and typically underestimate the amount of reserve 
required based on historical data [8]. For example, GSFC’s 
GPR 7120.7 equates to roughly a 13% schedule reserve from 
the start of Phase B for a typical 6-year development while 
JPL’s Design Principles also equates to roughly 10% 
schedule reserve for the same duration [14]–[15]. These 
reserves, however, are significantly lower than the historical 
33% or greater instrument schedule growth than has been 
shown in both references [7]–[8], and this study. The 33% 
equates to a rule of thumb of 4 months of reserve out of every 
year of development, which is considered to be excessive 
given the general rule of thumb of 1 to 2 months out of every 
year of mission development. The authors believe that it 
would be much better to more accurately forecast the duration 
of instrument schedules, as discussed in Section 4.3, than to 
supply such a large amount of allocated reserves. Some 
lengthening of schedule reserve, however, is a worthwhile 
consideration for instruments specifically. 
4.3 Better Assessment of Instrument Schedule Duration 
One way to determine the critical path early in a project’s 
lifetime is to use historical data to estimate the development 
duration of both the spacecraft and instrument(s).  
Aerospace began collecting schedule data for both complete 
mission development durations, spacecraft and instrument 
development durations, and satellite I&T durations in the 
early 2000s. Collection of this data led to the development  
of a schedule estimating tool where specific analogies  
are used to estimate development durations of the spacecraft 
and instrument to determine which may be on the  
critical path [16]. This tool is used by Aerospace to provide 
feedback on a project’s development schedule to provide 
recommendations on making the schedule more robust.   
NASA has also put forth a major effort to collect schedule 
data in the Cost Analysis Data Requirement (CADRe) 
activity that is essential in helping assess reasonable cost  
and schedules [17]. The NASA Instrument Cost Model  
 
 
(NICM) utilizes CADRe data, and other sources, to also 
provide insight into the potential instrument development 
duration [18]. 
4.4 Change in Acquisition Approach 
Changing the acquisition approach may also provide some 
relief in developing a more realistic critical path early in the 
project lifetime. A potential alternative acquisition approach, 
presented previously by one of the authors and the NASA 
Earth Science Technology Office, is to start the instrument 
development prior to mission start, otherwise known as an 
instrument first, spacecraft second (IFSS) approach [19].  
The IFSS approach brings the instrument(s) to a CDR level 
of maturity prior to starting a mission which, by design, 
places the instrument on the critical path from the beginning.  
The IFSS approach has been identified to significantly reduce 
the collateral mission cost growth due to instrument delays 
and result in more missions being funded for less cost when 
utilized for a portfolio of missions [20]. 
5. SUMMARY 
This study provides a historical assessment of the critical path 
for 40 NASA science missions. The results show that 
instrument development duration growth is greater than 
spacecraft development growth. Further, the instrument is on 
the critical path prior to System I&T more than 75% of the 
time even though the instrument and spacecraft are equally 
specified as the critical path at early project milestones. This 
implies a need to increase consideration of putting the 
instrument on the critical path early in the project’s 
development. Recommendations include increasing the 
awareness of instrument development difficulties by 
publicizing supporting research and codifying in NASA 
handbooks, potentially increasing schedule reserves 
dedicated to instruments, using historical data to more 
accurately estimate instrument schedule durations, and 
potentially following an IFSS acquisition approach to 
minimize the impact of instrument delivery schedule delays 
on mission development. More accurately forecasting the 
instrument development durations and placing the instrument 
on the critical path early in a project’s lifecycle, will allow 
for a more robust schedule to minimize both overall mission 
schedule and cost growth. 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
The authors would like to acknowledge the contributions of 
Claude Freaner, retired from NASA Headquarters Science 
Mission Directorate, who pioneered the critical and 
introspective look at NASA’s performance — as noted in the 
many references cited — for NASA’s missions, spacecraft, 
and instruments of which this work is a continuation. The 
reviewers who volunteered their time also provided valuable 
feedback which was incorporated into the final product. 
Lastly, the authors would like to thank Linda Wunderlick for 
her thoughtful comments and editing of the paper. 
 6 
REFERENCES 
[1] NASA Office of the Chief Engineer, “NASA Systems 
Engineering Handbook,” NASA SP-2016-6105 Rev2, 
February 2017. 
[2] Definition of “Playing Chicken,” Collins Dictionary, 
https://www.collinsdictionary.com/us/dictionary/englis
h/play-chicken, accessed October 5, 2019. 
[3] NASA Office of the Chief Engineer, “NASA Instrument 
Capability Study (NICS) Final Report,” December 2009. 
[4] K. Kipp, S. Ringler, E. Chapman, and C. Freaner, 
“Impact of Instrument Schedule Growth on Mission 
Cost,” presented at the 2012 IEEE Aerospace 
Conference, Big Sky, Montana, March 2012. 
[5] R. Bitten, D. Emmons, and C. Freaner, “Using Historical 
NASA Cost and Schedule Growth to Set Future Program 
and Project Reserve Guidelines,” presented at the 2007 
IEEE Aerospace Conference, Big Sky, Montana,  
March 2007. 
[6] R. Bitten, C. Freaner, and E. Emmons, “Optimism in 
Early Conceptual Designs and Its Effect on Cost and 
Schedule Growth: An Update,” presented at the 2010 
IEEE Aerospace Conference, Big Sky, Montana,  
March 2010. 
[7] NASA Office of the Chief Engineer, “NASA Space 
Flight Program and Project Management Handbook,” 
NASA/SP-2014-3705, September 2014. 
[8] R. Bitten and S. Shinn, “Historical Mass, Power, 
Schedule, and Cost Growth for NASA Science 
Instruments,” presented at the 2014 IEEE Aerospace 
Conference, Big Sky, Montana, March 2014. 
[9] M. Hayhurst, R. Bitten, S. Shinn, D. Judnick,  
I. Hallgrimson, and M. Youngs, “Historical Mass, 
Power, Schedule, and Cost Growth for NASA Science 
Spacecraft,” presented at the 2016 IEEE Aerospace 
Conference, Big Sky, Montana, March 2016. 
 [10]W. Majerowicz, R. Bitten, D. Emmons, and S. Shinn, 
“Contribution of Schedule Delays to Cost Growth:         
How to Make Peace with a Marching Army,” presented 
at the 2016 IEEE Aerospace Conference, Big Sky, 
Montana, March 2016. 
 [11]NASA Office of the Chief Engineer, “Expanded 
Guidance for NASA Systems Engineering Volume 1:  
Systems Engineering Practices,” NASA/SP-2016-6105-
SUPPL, March 2016. 
[12] NASA Office of the Chief Engineer, “NASA Schedule 
Management Handbook,” NASA/SP-2010-3403,  
March 2011. 
[13] W. Majerowicz and S. Shinn, “Schedule Matters:  
Understanding the Relationship between Schedule 
Delays and Costs on Overruns,” presented at the 2016 
IEEE Aerospace Conference, Big Sky, Montana,  
March 2016. 
[14] NASA Goddard Procedural Requirement (GPR) 
7120.7B “Funded Schedule Margin and Budget Margin 
for Flight Projects,” September 2018. 
[15] JPL Design Principles, Design, Verification/Validation 
and Operations Principles for Flight Systems, JPL-D-
17868 Rev. 2, March 3, 2003. 
[16] D. Emmons and R. Bitten, “Quantitative Approach to 
Independent Schedule Estimates of NASA Science 
Missions,” presented at the 2009 IEEE Aerospace 
Conference, Big Sky, Montana, March 2009 
[17] NASA Cost Analysis Data Requirements website, 
https://www.nasa.gov/offices/ocfo/functions/models_to
ols/CADRe_ONCE.html, accessed October 5, 2019. 
[18] NASA Instrument Cost Model website, 
https://www.nasa.gov/offices/ocfo/functions/models_to
ols/nicm, accessed October 5, 2019. 
[19] R. Bitten and E. Mahr, “Instrument First, Spacecraft 
Second (IFSS): A New Paradigm in Space Mission 
Development,” presented at the 2010 IGARSS 
Conference, Honolulu, Hawaii, August 2010. 
[20] R. Bitten, E. Mahr, and C. Freaner, “Instrument First, 
Spacecraft Second (IFSS): Options for Implementing a 
New Paradigm,” presented at the 2012 IEEE Aerospace 
Conference, Big Sky, Montana, March 2012. 
BIOGRAPHY 
Robert Bitten is a Technical Fellow at 
The Aerospace Corporation and has 
conducted independent cost estimates 
for NASA proposal evaluations and 
independent assessments for a variety of 
different NASA missions and 
organizations. He is a winner of The 
Aerospace Corporation’s President’s 
Award for his effort in assessing the cost 
effectiveness of different alternatives in the Hubble Space 
Telescope Remote Servicing Module Analysis of Alternatives. 
He also won the 2007 NASA Cost Estimating Support 
Contractor of the Year Award that is awarded to recognize 
an individual who has provided “outstanding contractor 
support to the NASA cost estimating community and 
significantly contributed to the field of cost estimating.” He 
has a Bachelor’s in Industrial and Systems Engineering 
(B.I.E) from the Georgia Institute of Technology and a 
M.B.A. from Pepperdine University. 
 7 
Steve Shinn is the Deputy Chief 
Financial Officer for Center Operations 
for NASA. In this role, he is responsible 
for the day-to-day operations of Center 
OCFO Operations by providing 
leadership for the planning, analysis, 
management, and operations of NASA’s 
field Centers and NASA Headquarters 
operational resources functions. He ensures effective 
management, efficient use of Agency resources, and that 
NASA Center resources are effectively employed toward the 
achievement of NASA's strategic plan and overall mission. 
He serves as the Agency liaison for all operational decisions 
regarding manpower, staffing, and strategic approach for 
OCFO staff at the Centers. Before accepting this position in 
2019, Mr. Shinn served as Chief Financial Officer for 
NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center since 2016 and is 
acting until a replacement is named. He ensured the financial 
health of GSFC by leading and managing nearly 600 civil 
servant and contractor business personnel in the 
development, implementation, and administration of all 
Center budgeting ($5B annual budget), finance, accounting, 
business systems, financial audits/internal controls, and cost-
estimating activities that enable the effective management, 
control, and reporting of the government’s assets. Previously 
Mr. Shinn served as deputy director for planning & business 
management for GSFC’s Flight Projects Directorate, a 
position he held beginning May 2011. He managed all 
matters related to business, PP&C, resource management, 
organizational staffing, workforce development, diversity 
and equal opportunity, and physical assets. He is also an 
instructor in PP&C at The Johns Hopkins University Whiting 
School of Engineering. He was awarded NASA’s Agency 
Honor Award and Robert H. Goddard Award for Leadership 
for his efforts in leading business change and organizational 
management. He was also awarded NASA’s Cost Estimating 
Award for Leadership and has received three team awards 
for Quality and Process Improvement for initiatives he 
championed and led for business change, risk analysis, and 
career path development. He received NASA’s Equal 
Employment Opportunity Medal in 2016 for his work 
promoting and modeling diversity and inclusion. 
